BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS – LLC MEMBERS
The Tennessee Court of Appeals found support for membership
status at formation based on the organizational documents and the
conduct of the parties before and after formation of the limited
liability company. However, the Court of Appeals vacated and
remanded the case back to the trial court because the trial court
applied the incorrect statute in determining the inspection rights of
the member. Heatherly v. Off the Wagon Tours, LLC, No. M2019-01582COA-R3-CV, 2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 337, 2021 WL 3722155 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Nov. 17, 2020).
Erika Holmes
In Heatherly v. Off the Wagon Tours, LLC, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals considered whether Rickie Heatherly (“Heatherly”) was a
member of Off The Wagon Tours, LLC (“Off The Wagon”) and thus
entitled to have his request to inspect and copy of Off The Wagon’s
records fulfilled. The case was appealed following a bench trial in which
the trial court issued an inspection order based on the finding that
Heatherly was a member of Off The Wagon and was therefore entitled to
inspect and copy the records as requested. The trial court also awarded
Heatherly costs and attorney’s fees, reasoning Carney had no reasonable
basis to deny Heatherly’s request to inspect. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s finding that Heatherly was a member of Off the
Wagon at formation; however, the case was remanded back to the trial
court for determination of whether Heatherly continued to be a member
of Off The Wagon or if his membership status was terminated, and if so,
when it was terminated. The determination of membership status impacts
whether restrictions apply to Heatherly’s request for inspection under the
Revised Limited Liability Company Act which was not properly
considered1.
Prior to commencement of this action, Heatherly developed an
idea to create a “party vehicle” business comprised of a tractor and
custom-built wagon. Id. at *3. Carney liked the business idea and began
The trial court improperly relied on the Tennessee Limited Liability Company Act in
ordering inspection when the applicable statute was under the Revised Limited Liability
Company Act based on the date of the limited liability company’s (“LLC’s”) formation.
1
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work to form Off The Wagon. Initially, in exchange for his idea, Carney
offered Heatherly 3% membership interest. Two others were also offered
membership interest in exchange for cash contributions. When the
potential investors opted out of the business, Carney offered Heatherly
5% membership interest, rather than 3%, in exchange for his idea and to
assist in starting the business. Heatherly accepted the 5% offer.
Carney utilized the online legal services platform Legal Zoom to
form Off The Wagon, draft and file the Articles of Incorporation (the
“Articles”), and draft an operating agreement. Legal Zoom filed the
Articles with the Tennessee Secretary of State on February 24, 2016.
Although Carney indicated to Legal Zoom that the members were himself,
Heatherly, Danny Cage, and Steven Reese, the filed Articles did not specify
who the members were. The Articles simply stated Off The Wagon, was
manager-managed, Carney was the manager, and that Off The Wagon had
four members. The final operating agreement only listed Carney and
Heatherly as members and was signed by Carney but not Heatherly. The
startup funds were provided by Carney while Heatherly contributed his
ideas and labor. Additionally, Heatherly provided money to Off The
Wagon’s account for the purchase of insurance as well as some
membership fees.
On April 8, 2016, Off The Wagon opened for business. The
tractor was driven by Heatherly. Carney was responsible for handling the
paperwork and customers. As the business continued, Carney presented
Heatherly with two additional offers for membership interest. One offer
in August 2016 in which Heatherly would receive an additional 5%
membership interest in exchange for $10,000 in sweat equity and another
offer for an additional 5% interest when a second wagon was purchased
for the business.
Eventually, there was a breakdown in relations between Heatherly
and Carney. On November 18, 2016, Carney furnished Heatherly with two
letters, one regarding an offer to purchase Heatherly’s shares, and another,
a buyout agreement indicating Heatherly was no longer needed for Off
The Wagon because Heatherly did not comply with the agreed upon
standards and rules. Carney signed the buyout agreement, and although
Heatherly ceased to work for Off The Wagon, he never signed the buyout
agreement. Heatherly’s membership interest purportedly continued until
August 30, 2018, as reflected in documents filed with the Tennessee
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Secretary of State. The 2017 annual report for Off The Wagon indicated
there were no longer four members, only two. The number of members
was further reduced to one in the annual report filed after the case began.
Carney indicated discrepancy in the 2017 annual report was the fault of
Legal Zoom.
In May 2017, Heatherly demanded payment “for both his
membership interest and the work he performed for the LLC.” Id. at *7.
Heatherly also made a written request to access to Off The Wagon’s books
and records in August 2017. Off The Wagon never complied with this
request.
This action was initiated after Off The Wagon failed to make
company documents and records available for inspection following
Heatherly’s written request. Heatherly sought relief under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 48-228-104. Off The Wagon contended Heatherly was not entitled
to the requested documents and records because he “[was] not, and had
never been, an owner or member of Off The Wagon Tours, LLC.”
Heatherly, 2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 337 at *2.
At trial over the disputed membership status of Heatherly,
testimony was heard from both Heatherly and Carney, evidence of the
sweat equity proposal was admitted,2 and testimony of Carney and
Heatherly as business partners was presented.3 The trial court ruled
Heatherly was a member of Off The Wagon at the time of formation and
as such was entitled to access and inspection of Off The Wagon’s records
based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-228-104. Off The Wagon was ordered to
allow inspection; however, Heatherly was restricted in his use of the
records. Heatherly was also awarded attorney’s fees and costs because the
trial court found Carney lacked a reasonable basis to question Heatherly’s
inspection rights.
In reviewing the findings and ruling of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals found Heatherly was a member of Off The Wagon; however, the
inspection order was not upheld. The Court of Appeals remanded the case
“A picture of the proposal [written on a white board] was admitted as an exhibit[.]”
Heatherly, 2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 337 at *5.
3 A competing business owner “understood from conversations with both men that
they were ‘partners of some kind.’” Id. at *7
2
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to the trial court to establish whether Heatherly was still a member or if
his membership status was terminated, and if so, when. The status of
Heatherly’s membership is important for determining restrictions on
Heatherly’s right to inspection.
The Court of Appeals first reviewed the trial court’s finding that
Heatherly was a member of Off The Wagon. Carney argued that although
he did offer Heatherly membership interest, “there was a condition
precedent to becoming a member . . . that Heatherly never completed . . .
.” Heatherly, 2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 337 at *9. The Court of Appeals
declined to order additional findings regarding the terms of Carney and
Heatherly’s membership agreement reasoning there was “sufficient
findings of fact and conclusions of law” in the trial court’s opinion to
“determine how the court reached its ultimate conclusion on the
inspection of records.” Id. at *9 n.1.
In Tennessee, the statutes that govern LLCs depend on the LLC's
date of formation. The Tennessee Revised Limited Liability Company Act
(“Revised Act”) applies to LLCs formed after January 1, 2006. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 48-249-1002(a)(1)(A). “[T]he Tennessee Limited Liability
Company Act applies to domestic LLCs, formed before January 1, 2006,
that have not elected to be governed by the Revised Act.” Heatherly, 2021
Tenn. App. LEXIS 337 at *13 (citing Tenn. Code. Ann. § 48-249-1002(c)).
Off The Wagon was formed in 2016; therefore, the Revised Act was
applicable to this case.
Under the Revised Act, a member is defined as “a person that has
been admitted to an LLC as a member, provided in § 48-249-501.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 48-249-102(20). A person may become a member at
formation of the LLC or at a later time. Id. § 48-249-501(a), (b). An LLC
is considered formed when the articles of incorporation are filed. Id. § 48249-201(a). The LLC documents, the articles of organization and the
operating agreement, may provide evidence of a person’s membership
status, but they are not conclusive. Id. § 48-249-102(16). Id. § 48-249501(a), (b). Members may, but are not required, to enter into an operating
agreement. Id. § 48-249-203(a). Additionally, relevant evidence of a
person’s membership status is the conduct of the parties before and after
formation. See Parigin v. Mills, No. E2016-00640-COA-R3-CV, 2017 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 179, 2019 WL 1032740, at *7–8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16,
2017). An individual’s membership status is important because LLC

2022]

CASE COMMENTARY

545

members and former members have a statutory right to access records of
the LLC, and if the LLC denies access the LLC “may summarily order
inspection or copying of the records demanded, at the expense of the
LLC.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-308(d).
Despite Carney’s claims that Heatherly was not a member of Off
The Wagon because the sweat equity condition precedent was not fulfilled,
the Court of Appeals found ample support that Heatherly was a member
at formation of Off The Wagon. Off The Wagon’s filed Articles, which
formed Off The Wagon, indicated there were four members, one of whom
Carney later identified as Heatherly. The operating agreement for Off The
Wagon also listed Heatherly as a member. Furthermore, Heatherly
accepted Carney’s offer of 5% membership interest in exchange for his
idea and labor, which Heatherly provided. The Court of Appeals did not
find support in Carney’s argument that the agreement for membership
interest was solely the agreement of 5% interest in exchange for $10,000
in sweat equity. The Court of Appeals pointed to the picture of the white
board proposal as evidence that the sweat equity requirement in exchange
for 5% interest was for an additional 5% interest.
After determining Heatherly the trial court properly found to be a
member of Off The Wagon, the Court of Appeals then assessed the
validity of the trial court’s inspection order and Heatherly’s inspection
rights. The Court of Appeals found the trial court applied the incorrect
statute when ruling Heatherly was entitled to inspection of the Off The
Wagon’s records. The trial court relied on inspection rights under the
Tennessee Limited Liability Company Act, not the Revised Act which was
applicable to Off The Wagon given the date of formation. Because the
Revised Act is applicable in this case, it is important to establish whether
Heatherly’s membership interest was terminated, and if so, when because
it will establish the extent of the documents and records Heatherly is
entitled to. Differing from the Limited Liability Company Act, both
members and former members are explicitly given rights to access LLC’s
records by the Revised Act; however, the extent of records the requesting
party is entitled to is restricted. Id. § 48-249-308(a). The Revised Act limits
former members’ access to records to “proper purposes pertaining to the
periods during which they were members.” Id.
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Despite the Court of Appeals holding that Heatherly was a
member of Off The Wagon at formation, the Court of Appeals vacated
the trial court’s inspection order with instructions to establish whether
Heatherly was still a member or whether his membership status had been
terminated. This finding impacts what records Heatherly is entitled to have
access to because the incorrect statute was applied at the trial level.
Considering the ruling in this case, business law attorneys in
Tennessee should be careful in their statutory analysis. Attorneys should
bear in mind the formation date of the LLC will dictate the applicable
statutory inspection rights of members. LLCs should consult an attorney
before denying requests for inspection because denying requests for
inspection could lead to additional expenses the LLC will incur should a
court order inspection or copying. Furthermore, attorneys litigating right
to inspection and copying matters should ensure the court applies the
proper statute to minimize appealable issues.
Additionally, attorneys should stress to clients the importance of
clear establishment of who members of the LLC are and members’
inspection rights, specifically for those LLCs formed after January 1, 2006
and governed by the Revised Act. In the event there is a breakdown in
relations among members, documentation should clearly establish the
departing member’s membership interest has been terminated. Otherwise,
despite a member’s departure, they could continue to be entitled to access
to the LLC’s records and documents based on a member’s statutory right
to access records under Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-249-308(a).

CONTRACTS – ENFORCEABILITY OF AN OPTIONS
CONTRACT
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that when an option
agreement provides that the option price is to be mutually agreed
upon by the parties after the option to purchase is exercised, the
contract is unenforceable because the price is not reasonably
ascertainable, despite the option agreement including parameters
for the purchase price. In addition, under Tennessee law, when an
essential element, like price, remains to be negotiated, a duty to
negotiate in good faith does not arise absent an express contractual
agreement. LVH, LLC v. Freeman Inv., LLC, No. M2020-00698-COAR3-CV, 2021 WL 1943370, 2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 22, 2021).
Alex Sosnowski
In LVH, LLC v. Freeman Investment, LLC, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals addressed whether an option agreement was enforceable between
a professional development company and a property owner. The plaintiff,
LVH, LLC (“LVH”), sought specific performance and unjust enrichment
for an option agreement (“the Agreement”) entered into with Freeman
Investment, LLC (“FI”), the owner of the property at issue. FI took the
position that the Agreement was not an enforceable contract because the
option price remained open to negotiation after LVH exercised their
option. The court agreed with FI that the price was not reasonably
ascertainable by a court and held that the Agreement is merely an
agreement to agree, which is not enforceable under Tennessee Law. Due
to the court’s determination that the Agreement was not an enforceable
contract, the court remanded the unjust enrichment claim to the trial
court.
FI is the owner of a twelve-acre parcel of property (“the
Property”) which LVH identified as a possible site for a multi-family real
estate development. After negotiations, LVH and FI entered into an
option agreement in February 2018. The Agreement granted LVH an
exclusive option to purchase the Property by March 15, 2019. In paragraph
2 of the Agreement, the parties set out parameters for a purchase price.
The Agreement stated that the option price was to be based on a minimum
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of 125 residential units, at a price of $20,000 per unit. However, paragraph
2 also states that the option price is “[t]o be mutually agreed upon by Buyer
and Seller.” LVH, 2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188, at *14. Further,
paragraph 3 covers the deposit amount upon execution of the Agreement
and provides that the deposit amount is to be returned to the buyer in the
event the buyer and seller cannot agree on a price.
On February 26, 2019, LVH exercised its option to purchase the
Property. LVH calculated that 119 residential units could be developed on
the Property and applied the option price of $20,000 per unit at a
minimum of 125 units; therefore, in a draft contract of sale, LVH set forth
a price of $2,500,000. In response to LVH’s intent to exercise the option
for $2,500,000, FI informed LVH that it was willing to sell the Property
for $9,975,000.
In April 2019, LVH sued FI for specific performance and unjust
enrichment. Both parties moved for summary judgment on whether the
Agreement was an enforceable contract. The trial court determined that
the option price in the Agreement was “sufficiently ascertainable to be
enforceable” and that FI breached the contract. Id. at *5. Due to the trial
court finding the Agreement unenforceable, they did not address the
unjust enrichment claim except for denying both parties’ motions for
summary judgment because “there are genuine issues of material facts as
to whether a benefit was conferred on FI and whether FI accepted that
benefit.” Id. at *17–18.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s holding. The court
concluded that the Agreement was not enforceable because the
Agreement is merely an agreement to agree, which is unenforceable in
Tennessee.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by discussing the
principles governing the enforceability of a contract. For any contract to
be enforceable, including an option contract, “the parties must agree on
the material terms.”1 In addition, the terms of the contract must be
“sufficiently definite to enable a court to give it an exact meaning.” United
Am. Bank of Memphis v. Walker, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3368, at *1 (Tenn.

1

Abbott v. Abbott, No. E2015-01233-COA-R3-CV, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 512, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2016)). The court in Abbot further states that “[p]rice is
generally considered an essential term in a sales contract. Id.
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Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1986). If the contract is clear and unambiguous, the
literal meaning of the contract governs.
The Court of Appeals then turned to Fourth Eights, LLC v. Salem,
a similar case decided by the appellate court involving the enforceability
of an option agreement granting a party the right to purchase property.
194 S.W.3d 484, 484 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). The option agreement in Four
Eights granted a tenant the option to purchase the property at “its then fair
market value” and that “Fair Market Value must be determined by the
lessor and Lessee, negotiating in good faith, within thirty days … of the
election to purchase the Premises.” Id. at 486. The Court of Appeals
concluded that because the parties must determine the fair market value,
the “parties basically made an ‘agreement to agree’ to something in the
future, and such agreements have generally been held unenforceable, both
in this jurisdiction and others.” Id. In the present case, the court asserts
that their holding in Four Eights follows the general principle that “in order
for a contract to be binding it must spell out the obligation of the parties
with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed.” See Id. at 487 (citing
United Am. Bank of Memphis, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3368, at *4).
In another case, the Court of Appeals held that the operative
provision, “Purchase price to be mutually agreed upon based on
[independent] appraisal at time of notice to sell” made the option
agreement unenforceable. Huber v. Calloway, No. M2005-00897-COA-R3CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 435, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2007). In
Huber, the court noted that if the phrase “based on [independent]
appraisal” stood alone, it would be conceivable for the agreement to be
enforceable. Id. at *5. However, in the context of the entire agreement,
specifically, “[P]rice to be mutually agreed upon[,]” the only possible
meaning is that the parties agreed to negotiate price and that a sale would
only occur if the parties made an agreement. See Id.
In the present case, LVH argues that the price parameters in
paragraph 2 set forth a specific formula for calculating the option price;
therefore, the purchase price is not left open for future negotiations. The
Court of Appeals disagreed with LVH’s interpretation, because the
Agreement “also states that the option price is to be mutually agreed upon
by the parties within 30 days of the end of the option period.” LVH, 2021
Tenn. App. LEXIS 188, at *16–17. In addition, the court noted that even
if paragraph 2 can be construed to provide a definite price term, paragraph
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3 provides that the buyer’s deposit is to be returned if an agreement on
price cannot be made. In the context of the entire Agreement, the
Agreement contemplates that the option price will be determined after
future negotiations, to which the parties may not agree. Therefore, the
option price is not reasonably ascertainable by a court, and due to that
price being an essential element of the Agreement, the Agreement is
unenforceable and is no more than an agreement to agree.
In an important footnote, the court addressed the issue of whether
an agreement with essential terms remaining to be negotiated subjects the
parties to negotiate those terms in good faith. The court stated that in
Tennessee, the duty of good faith does not arise in future negotiations
“absent an express contractual agreement.” Barnes & Robinson Co. v.
OneSource Facility Servs., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
Therefore, in this case, LVH and FI have no duty to negotiate in good
faith because the Agreement is silent on the matter.
Finally, for LVH’s unjust enrichment claim, the trial court denied
LVH’s motion for summary judgment and did not address the claim at
trial because their holding on the enforceability of the Agreement
pretermitted the unjust enrichment claim. Now that the appellate court
has held the Agreement unenforceable, they remand the unjust
enrichment claim to be further addressed.2
This case demonstrates three crucial factors for transactional
practitioners. First, if a contract sets out parameters for a purchase price,
those parameters will likely not hold legal weight if the contract also
provides that the parties shall mutually agree upon the price. Second,
practitioners should be careful of provisions covering security deposits.
The court here expressed that even if paragraph 2 of the Agreement did
not provide that the parties will mutually agree on the option price,
paragraph 2 could be construed as sufficiently definite on price, paragraph
3 provides that the buyer’s deposit is to be returned if an agreement on
price cannot be agreed upon. Third, if it is necessary to have a contract
where essential elements are left open for negotiations, it is essential to
consider that in Tennessee, the duty of good faith does not arise in future
negotiations “absent an express contractual agreement.” Id.
2

On remand, the trial court will address whether FI received a benefit and whether
they accepted that benefit. If a benefit was conferred on FI and they accepted that
benefit, the trial court will address the value of the benefit received.

CONTRACTS – ORAL & STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that an admission by a party
claiming to be a party to an oral contract is a legal conclusion that
is not required to be taken as true and which requires a
determination by the court. By continuing under a revenue-sharing
agreement following an alleged material breach, the alleging party
waives the right to assert the material breach as a bar to a breach of
contract claim. In such a case, when an enforceable contract exists,
it is proper to deny requests for quasi-contract damages under the
theories of unjust enrichment and money had and received. Old
Hickory Coaches, LLC v. Star Coach Rentals, Inc., No. M2020-COA-R3-CV,
2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2021).
S. Chase Talbot
In Old Hickory Coaches, LLC v. Star Coach Rentals, Inc., the Tennessee
Court of Appeals determined that the oral contract formed between the
parties was enforceable and not a violation of the statute of frauds, as it
potentially could be completed within a year. In addition, the Court of
Appeals addressed whether James Copeland’s, the CEO and President of
Star Coach Rentals, Inc. (“Star Coach”), admission of being a party to the
suit made him an individual defendant or only a party to the suit in his
official capacity. The court found that when a party admits to being a party
to an oral contract, the admission is not binding because it is a legal
conclusion, the determination of which rests with the court. Upon
determining the oral contract was valid and Mr. Copeland was a party to
the lawsuit only in his official capacity, the court determined that
continuing under the revenue-sharing agreement following an alleged
material breach waived the right to assert the material breach as a bar to a
breach of contract claim. Finally, the court found that quasi-contract
damages under the theories of unjust enrichment and money had and
received were improper as the oral contract was enforceable.
In 2000, Sherry Wise of Old Hickory Coaches, LLC (“Hickory
Coaches”) agreed to a revenue-sharing agreement with Mr. Copeland of
Star Coach Rentals, Inc. via a “handshake deal.” Per the agreement,
(1) Old Hickory would provide the trailers and trucks; (2)
Star Coach would lease the trailers and trucks to
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production companies; (3) the parties would split the
rental income 50/50; (4) Star Coach would be responsible
for routine maintenance and storage; and (5) Old Hickory
would be responsible for major repairs and renovations.
To start, Old Hickory sent Star Coach six trailers and six trucks. In 2007,
a production company informed Mr. Copeland that new trailers would be
needed to maintain the contract with Star Coach. Mr. Copeland contacted
Ms. Wise, who purchased two new trailers and delivered them to Star
Coach; however, no new trucks were provided. The testimony
surrounding the need for new trucks was conflicting. Ms. Wise stated there
were no discussions involving the need for new trucks, while Mr.
Copeland testified that the current trucks were not adequate to pull the
new, bigger trailers. To accommodate the new trailers, Mr. Copeland
leased one of the trucks already in his possession and purchased another
to haul the second trailer. Ms. Wise testified that she was not informed
that Mr. Copeland was leasing his personal trucks, that the Old Hickory
trucks were insufficient, and that had she known, she would have
purchased the new trucks.
Later, in 2010, Ms. Wise discovered Star Coach’s failure to make
eleven weeks of payments per the revenue-sharing agreement. In June
2011, Ms. Wise sent a letter to Mr. Copeland regarding the money owed.
Within the letter, she specifically addressed the agreement was between
Star Coach and Old Hickory. Thereafter, the parties altered the agreement
to split the income 75/25 until the missed payments by Star Coach were
caught up, according to Ms. Wise. In actuality, Mr. Copeland retained the
seventy-five percent, citing “renovations” Star Coach had made to the
trailers in 2010 as a reason to keep the money and claiming that the eleven
weeks of missed payments was to help recover the costs. Realizing around
this time that Star Coach was still paying Old Hickory for both the trucks
and trailers, Mr. Copeland reduced the payments being made to Ms. Wise
to only include the rental profits of the trailers. After 2010, Mr. Copeland
continued to make major repairs and renovations to the trailers, claiming
Ms. Wise did not have the money. He estimated the total cost of repairs
to be $42,965.00. By the middle of 2015, the relationship between Star
Coach and Old Hickory terminated. In the fall of 2015, Ms. Wise picked
up the trailers and continued trying to settle the 2010 payment
discrepancies to no avail.
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In August 2016, Old Hickory sued Star Coach and Mr. Copeland
for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The trial court awarded
damages to Old Hickory pursuant to the revenue-sharing agreement in the
amount of $101,529.00 and awarded damages to Star Coach for the repairs
and renovations in the amount of $12,415.00. In addition, the trial court
found Mr. Copeland acted strictly in his professional capacity, refusing to
name him as an individual defendant.
On appeal, the trial court’s decision was affirmed. The Court of
Appeals held that Mr. Copeland was not bound by his alleged admission
of being a party to the contract, as it was a legal conclusion that was not
required to be taken as true and necessitated a determination by the court.
In addition, upon determining that the revenue-sharing agreement was a
valid contract, the appellate court affirmed the denial of quasi-contract
damages under the theories of unjust enrichment and money had and
received.
The Court of Appeals began by discussing whether Mr. Copeland
had admitted that he was personally a party to the contract with Old
Hickory. While Old Hickory’s brief argued that Mr. Copeland’s use of
“Defendants” in his answer indicated that he was a party in his individual
capacity, the court noted in the same paragraphs that Mr. Copeland used
“it” in reference to “Defendants.” In Nichols v. Blocker, No. 87-110-II, 1988
Tenn. App. LEXIS 262 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1988), the court
explained that a party is bound by admitting the existence of a contract;
however, admitting the contract is binding and enforceable is a legal
conclusion. Furthermore, having discussed the law involving admissions
within an answer in Sakaan, the court reiterated that while facts confessed
in pleadings are binding on the party, an “inadvertent assent” to a legal
assertion is not controlling. Sakaan v. Fedex Corp., Inc., No. W2016-00648COA-R3-CV, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016). Thus, even if Mr.
Copeland had admitted to being a party in his individual capacity, the
admission would not have been required to be taken as true.
In determining that the alleged admission by Mr. Copeland was a
question of law requiring a legal determination, the court moved to discuss
whether he was a personal defendant. The court found this issue to lack
merit. While the trial court found Mr. Copeland was only operating in his
professional capacity, even if he had been found to be a personal
defendant, Old Hickory did not prove any personal liability against Mr.
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Copeland. Old Hickory also failed to raise this issue of Mr. Copeland’s
personal liability on appeal.
Next, the court addressed whether an enforceable contract had
been formed. In Tolliver v. Tellico Vill. Prop. Owners Asss’n, Inc., 579 S.W.3d
8, 28 n. 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019), the court previously held that the statute
of frauds does not bar the enforcement of an oral contract if it is possible
for the defendant to complete performance within one year. Supported by
Mr. Copeland’s statements that the contracts “ran from year to year,” the
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision that it was possible for
the agreement between the parties to be fully performed within one year.
Because the contract was found to be enforceable, the court determined
unjust enrichment and quasi-contract damages were improper. It is only
where there is no enforceable contract, and the court must impose a
contractual obligation, that a party may benefit from quasi-contract
damages. B&L Corp. v. Thomas & Thorngren, Inc., 162 S.W.3d 189, 217
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
The court then turned to the issues of whether Star Coach
breached the contract and whether damages were proper to Old Hickory.
Star Coach argued that even if they did breach the contract, it was
preceded by Old Hickory’s material breach of failing to supply new trucks.
The court noted that in McClain v. Kimbrough Constr. Co., 806 S.W.2d 194
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), they held that the defaulting party must be notified
of the breach in order to allow it to be corrected. The trial court found no
evidence that Ms. Wise was informed that Star Coach would keep all the
rental income for the trucks and only remit half of the income from the
trailers. As the trial court can observe and assess the credibility of the
parties, the appellate court did not find by clear and convincing evidence
that Star Coach satisfied the notice requirement outlined in McClain.
Furthermore, a party to a contract that accepts the benefits with
knowledge of a breach waives the right to assert the material breach as a
bar to a breach of contract claim. Madden Phillips Constr. v. GGAT Dev.
Corp., 315 S.W.3d 800, 815 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Thus, by continuing
under the agreement, Star Coach waived its right to assert Old Hickory’s
material breach.
In addition to reiterating foundational contract law, the decision
by the Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of separating
assertions of fact from legal conclusions. While it may not always be clear
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– especially in an oral agreement – any purported legal conclusions are not
required to be true and will fall under the determination of the court. Thus,
attorneys need to be diligent in separating what must be taken as true and
what must be determined by the court when analyzing and crafting their
pleadings.

GENERAL CONTRACTORS – PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7111 does not provide a private right of action for general contractors
against insurance companies for failure to comply with the statute.
Affordable Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 621 S.W.3d 693 (Tenn.
2021).
Alyx Thompson
In Affordable Construction Services, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance
Company, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether a general
contractor has a private right of action against an insurance company for
a violation of T.C.A. § 56-7-111. The court determined that the statute
does not expressly provide a private right of action to a general contractor.
The court also concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove the legislature’s
intent was to imply a private right of action.
Affordable Construction Services, Inc. (“Plaintiff”), a general
contractor, sued Auto-Owners Insurance, Co. (“Defendant”), an
insurance company, for violating T.C.A. § 56-7-111. The statute states that
when insurance losses accrue to insured property owners, the insurance
company shall include the general contractor of any uncompleted
construction or building contracts as a payee. Grand Valley Lakes Property
Owners Association (the “Property Owner”) owned the property at issue,
which was protected through a property and casualty insurance policy
insured by the Defendant. When the property was damaged due to a
severe weather event, the Property Owner hired the Plaintiff to repair the
property. When the Defendant paid the Property Owner the insurance
proceeds by check, the Defendant did not include the Plaintiff as a payee.
Subsequently, three lawsuits were filed concerning the payment of
insurance proceeds.
First, the Property Owner filed suit against the Defendant to claim
insurance proceeds as a result of the property damage. The Defendant
eventually issued a check payable only to the Property Owner. Second, the
Plaintiff sued the Defendant and the Property Owner to recover payment
for repairs made to the property, but the court dismissed the case because
the court found that the Plaintiff did not have an enforceable contract.
Lastly, in this case, the Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment against the
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Defendant and claimed that the Defendant violated T.C.A. § 56-17-111 by
failing to name the Plaintiff as a payee on the insurance proceeds check to
the Property Owner.
In a certified question from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Tennessee, the Tennessee Supreme Court
addressed whether general contractors have a private right of action for
violations of T.C.A. § 56-7-111. Two additional questions were certified
to the court: (1) whether there must have been a contract between the
general contractor and the insured for the insurance company to be
obligated to include the general contractor as a payee under T.C.A. § 567-111, and (2) if a contract is necessary, whether the contract must be
unfinished when the check is written. However, the court did not answer
the additional questions, as they proved to be unnecessary inquiries after
the court determined that T.C.A. § 56-7-111 did not provide a private right
of action for general contractors.
The Tennessee Supreme Court began by discussing who has the
authority to create a private right of action for violation of a statute and
how to determine if there is one, as set out in Inc. Brown v. Tenn. Title Loans,
Inc., 328 S.W.3d 850 (Tenn. 2010). The court noted in Brown that the
legislature, not the courts, has the power to create a private right of action.
Id. at 855. Determining whether a statute provides for a private right of
action is a question of law and statutory construction. Id. Either a private
right of action is expressly provided by the language of the statute or
implicitly provided by the structure and legislative history of the statute.
Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court found that the language of the statute
did not expressly provide for a private right of action.
The court then turned to examine whether a private right of action
was implicitly established by the structure and legislative history of the
statute, utilizing the framework set out in Brown. Id. In Brown, the
Tennessee Supreme Court weighed three factors in determining whether
the statute at issue created a private right of action: (1) whether the party
asserting the cause of action is an intended beneficiary of the statute’s
protection; (2) whether there is an indication of the legislature’s intent to
or not to create a private right of action, either expressly or impliedly; and
(3) whether implying a private right of action would be consistent with the
purpose of the statute. Id. The Brown court noted additional
considerations, such as stating that it will not imply enforcement of a
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provision if the act as a whole provides for a means of enforcement unless
the legislative intent is clear. Id. at 856. Additionally, the Brown court noted
that nonaction by the legislation is relevant when a legislature repeatedly
rejects a proposal to introduce a private right of action, even though it is
not usually a consideration. Id.
In analyzing the language, structure, and legislative history of the
statute, the Tennessee Supreme Court began by determining whether
T.C.A. § 56-7-111 is part of a larger regulatory scheme. Although it is part
of Title 56, which “broadly regulates the insurance industry,” it was not
found to be part of a larger regulatory scheme.
The court then applied the factors from Brown. First, the plaintiff
had the burden of proving that it was an intended beneficiary of T.C.A. §
56-7-111. As a general contractor and not an insurance company or an
insured owner, the plaintiff would benefit the most from a requirement
for an insurance company to name the general contractor as an additional
payee on an insurance proceeds check to the insured. Practically, the
statute protects general contractors by requiring them to endorse the
check before the insured cashes it, which would mean that general
contractors would likely not do so unless they had been paid. Statements
from Representative Jack Bowman, who introduced the House Bill that
became T.C.A. § 56-7-111, indicated that the purpose of the statute was
to ensure that there were no delays in payments to general contractors for
repairs. Therefore, the Court found that the Plaintiff was an intended
beneficiary of the statute.
Second, the Plaintiff had the burden of showing an indication of a
legislative intent to provide a private right of action through the statute.
The Plaintiff failed to do so, as there was nothing in the statutory structure
or legislative history to indicate that the legislature, either expressly or
impliedly, intended to provide a private right of action to general
contractors under this statute. Therefore, the court found that the Plaintiff
did not prove the second factor.
Last, the Plaintiff had to show that a private right of action would
be consistent with the purpose of the statute. The court found that
although the legislature intended for the statute to avoid delays in
payments, the statute did not provide a specific penalty. Under T.C.A. §
56-1-801, when the legislature does not provide a specific penalty for a
violation under chapters 2-4, 7, 11, and 32 of Title 56, the penalty is a class
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C misdemeanor. T.C.A. § 56-7-111 falls under T.C.A. § 56-1-801.
Therefore, as set out in Brown, the implication of a private right of action
for a regulatory statute with a governmental remedy would be
incompatible with the legislature’s intent. Therefore, the Plaintiff failed to
prove the last factor.
The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that T.C.A. § 56-7-111
did not expressly or impliedly provide a private right of action for general
contractors against insurance companies for violations of the statute and
answered the first certified question in the negative, consistent with the
framework set out in Brown for determining whether a statute provides a
private right of action. Business law practitioners should be aware that
when they represent general contractors or insurance companies, a suit
against an insurance company for a violation of T.C.A. § 56-7-111 is not
viable. Additionally, they should note that Tennessee courts will continue
to apply the factors from Brown in determining whether a statute provides
a private right of action and will specifically weigh the existence of an
alternative governmental remedy heavily in their determination.

CASE COMMENTARIES
REAL ESTATE – RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that restrictive covenants,
enacted in 1955, that restricted land to residential use did not apply
to land bought by the Defendant because the restrictive covenants
were retroactively enacted when the original owners did not own all
of the land. Phillips v. Hatfield 624 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2021).
Zachary Webber
In Phillips v. Hatfield, the court considered whether a restrictive
covenant executed in 1955 (“1955 Covenant”) applied to property
purchased decades later in 2016 and 2017 by Mark Hatfield (“the
Defendant”). The 1955 Covenant restricted the land to residential use. The
Defendant sought to use the land for non-residential purposes. Plaintiff
contests that the 1955 Covenant should apply because the covenants
stated that the restrictions ran with the land and the Defendant’s deed
stated “[t]his conveyance is made subject to valid restrictive covenants and
easements, if any, appearing of record.” The trial and appellate courts
found for the plaintiff, stating that it was their finding that there was an
implied negative reciprocal easement. However, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee found for the Defendant, holding that the 1955 Covenant did
not apply in this case. The decision hinged on the fact that the original
owners enacted the 1955 Convents when they did not own the entire plot
of land the covenants were intended to control.
The Defendant is the current owner of land purchased in 2016 and
2017. The Defendant purchased said land for the purpose of opening a
retail business. Richie and Roma Phillips (“the Plaintiffs”) own land and
reside in a home that shares a property line with the Defendant’s property.
Both properties are a part of what was previously known as a subdivision
called Sunnybrook Addition. J.C. and Mary Virginia Chambers (“the
Chambers”) were the original owners of that land and recorded a plat for
their land in 1953 dividing it up into sections or blocks, which ranged in
size. This plat did not restrict the land to residential use. Over the course
of the next year, the Chambers began to sell their land. Of the seventynine lots the Chambers platted, sixty-seven were sold. Included in the
deeds of sale were restrictive covenants (“the Original Covenants”) that
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stated, among other things, that “the property was to be used for
residential purposes only.” The deeds additionally provided that the
covenants ran with the land and were binding for twenty years. These lots
were resold numerous times since their initial selling in 1953–54.
In 1955, the Chambers recorded new covenants that were
intended to cover the entire subdivision. These new 1955 Covenants were
stated to run with the land and included restrictions on land use and
building type. These restrictions limited the lots to residential use.
However, none of the deeds that conveyed the Defendant’s property
mention the 1955 Covenants. The closest the deeds come to referencing
the covenant is the language that “the conveyance is subject to valid
restrictive covenants and easements, if any, appearing of record.” Phillips,
624 S.W.3d at 471. Using this evidence, the trial and appellate courts found
for the Plaintiffs, holding that the facts established an implied negative
reciprocal easement. As such, the Defendant's lot would be subject to the
residential use restriction. The case was then granted permission to be
heard at the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
The Court began its analysis by identifying that the only potential
restriction to the Defendant’s land would be the 1955 Covenants. The
Original Covenants do not apply because, per the language, the restrictions
expire after twenty years. This would place the expiration of the Original
Covenants at around 1970, well before the sale at issue in 2016–17. As
such, the Court analyzed the validity of the 1955 Covenants to determine
if the land purchased by the Defendant had a residential use restriction.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee first identified that landowners
have the ability to “sell portions thereof and make restrictions as to the
use for the benefit of himself as well as those to whom he sells other
portions of the land.” Laughlin v. Wagner, 244 S.W. 475, 476 (1922).
However, the Court went on to identify that “restrictive covenants are in
derogation of the right to free use and enjoyment of property.” As such
“Tennessee courts construe them strictly.” Phillips, 624 S.W.3d at
475; Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453, 475. Thus, “if the right
to enforce the covenant as to other property is doubtful such right will be
denied.” Shea v. Sargent, 499 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tenn. 1973) (quoting S.
Advert. Co. v. Sherman, 308 S.W.2d 491, 493 (1957)). Additionally, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee noted that other courts held that “a person
cannot restrict the use of another's land simply by recording restrictive
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covenants that purport to apply to that land.” Birdwood Subdivision
Homeowners’ Ass'n v. Bulotti Constr. Inc., 175 P.3d 179, 183 (2007).
Here, the Court notes that the language of the 1955 Covenants
attempted to cover all of the lots of Sunnybrook Addition. However, the
Chambers did not own the lots that later became the Defendant’s land
when the 1955 Covenants were put into place. Thus, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee deemed them ineffective. But, even so, the Court noted that
a future “grantor obviously would have had the authority to burden the
property.” As such, the Court then went on to see if any of the numerous
conveyances of the Defendant’s land contained language that would have
subjected the land to the restrictions of the 1955 Covenants.
The Court found that none of the conveyances after the 1955
Covenants applied. The Court found that some of the deeds had no
restrictions mentioned at all. Even a deed by which the Chambers
themselves resold lots in 1960 did not contain restrictive language. The
Court did acknowledge that the specific deed by which the Defendant
came to acquire the property did say that it was subject to “valid restrictive
covenants, if any, appearing on record.” Phillips, 624 S.W.3d at 476–77.
Even so, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reasoned that “under the
circumstances of this case, however, we do not believe this general
language reflects sufficient intent on the part of any grantor subsequent to
the recording of the 1955 Restrictive Covenants to subject the property to
the unnamed restrictions.” Id. at 477.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed the previous
courts’ finding the 1955 Covenants were implied negative reciprocal
easements. The Court first stated that Tennessee recognizes implied
negative reciprocal easements describing them to occur “when a property
owner subdivides land and sells lots with deed restrictions in accordance
with a general plan, the restrictions may be enforced by any grantee against
any other grantee.” Land Developers, Inc. v. Maxwell, 537 S.W.2d 904, 912
(Tenn. 1976). However, the Supreme Court of Tennessee found issue
again because the Chambers did not own all of the land that they
attempted to control with the 1955 Covenants. The Court referred to a
Michigan Supreme Court case in which the court reasoned that “[An
implied negative reciprocal easement] must start with a common owner.
Reciprocal negative easements are never retroactive.” Sanborn v. McLean,
206 N.W. 496, 497 (1925). The Supreme Court of Tennessee agreed,
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noting that Tennessee law also recognized that covenants should not be
given retroactive effect. See E. Sevier Cnty. Util. Dist. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr.
Co., 570 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tenn. 1978). The Court stated that since the
Chambers did not own all of the property when they created the 1955
Covenants, to apply the covenants would be applied retroactively, which
is improper.
Finally, the Court briefly addresses the argument that, since the
Chambers briefly reacquired the Defendant’s lots in 1956, the 1955
Covenants should apply. The Supreme Court of Tennessee found that
argument unpersuasive as well, stating that they do “not believe that the
implied negative reciprocal easement doctrine can be stretched to impose
a restriction upon property when the grantor parted ways with it before
attempting to impose the restriction, simply because the grantor
reacquired it a year after recording the purported restriction.” Phillips, 624
S.W.3d at 480.
For all the reasons above, the Supreme Court of Tennessee sided
with the Defendant and held that the Defendant’s property should not be
restricted by the 1955 Covenants. This case highlights two important
takeaways. The first is that the Supreme Court of Tennessee will not apply
covenants, especially restrictive covenants, retroactively. What this means,
practically, is that lawyers must ensure that their clients’ wants are
represented at the outset and ensure that, if the client wants to enact an
implied negative reciprocal easement, it is done correctly. Secondly, this
case further highlights the necessity to thoroughly check land records.

